Institutionalizing innovation:Instances of change in the Danish system of innovation by Molin, Måns J. & Selin, Cynthia Lea
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 20, 2017
Institutionalizing innovation
Instances of change in the Danish system of innovation
Molin, Måns J.; Selin, Cynthia Lea
Publication date:
2008
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Molin, M. J., & Selin, C. L. (2008). Institutionalizing innovation: Instances of change in the Danish system of
innovation. Paper presented at Prime-Latin America conference, Mexico City (MX), 24-26 Sep, .
Paper presented in the Prime-Latin America Conference at Mexico City, September 24-26 
2008  
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOVATION: INSTANCES OF CHANGE IN 
THE DANISH SYSTEM OF INNOVATION 
 
 
Måns J. Molin1 
Cynthia Selin2 
 
Abstract: 
Policy changes, globalization, and an intensified focus on knowledge 
in society relays a new role for universities and national laboratories where 
research is pursued to a larger extent in co-operation with industry. 
Research institutes must innovate or evaporate yet how to navigate and 
support innovation, including which aspects to formalize, remains vexing to 
most.   
 
This article explains how innovation became integrated in the general 
conceptualization and practice of technology transfer at Risø National 
Laboratory in Denmark and how these innovation activities were – and were 
not- institutionalized. Through an empirical investigation of the pragmatic 
routines, communicative practices, and strategic concepts developed and 
deployed, it becomes clear that the greatest advantages derive from 
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balancing tensions between preparedness of mind and openness to new 
interpretations of technical problems and their contexts.  
 
Key words: 
Technology Transfer, Innovation, Knowledge Brokering, Need Driven 
Innovation 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE LAB IN A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
Policy changes, globalization, and an intensified focus on knowledge in 
society relays a new role for national laboratories and universities in the 
post-industrial society. This focus on applied technology (Hargadon, 2006; 
Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994 p. 355-7) has been brought to the fore with 
concepts like National Systems of Innovation (Lundvall et al., 2002; 
Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall, 2005), Triple Helix (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 
2000), and Mode 2 (Nowotny et al., 2003) which emphasize the importance 
of knowledge creation in society at large and point towards a trend where 
research becomes more applied and is pursued to a larger extent in co-
operation with industry. However, how such role transformations actually 
occur within institutions – on the level of policy, practice, identity and 
knowledge – remains a dark area of scholarly attention.3  
This article tells the story of how ‘innovation’ became the strategy of 
technology transfer at Risø National Laboratory in Denmark and how these 
innovation activities were then institutionalized. The general strategy of 
Risø has historically been to create, develop and apply technology for the 
benefit of society. Traditionally this strategic research has been pursued in 
long term strategic programs within a larger political framework. 
As all national laboratories, Risø is a special policy case tasked to 
diffuse knowledge in society. That is, they are specifically accountable to 
the social good. Historically, their main strategic area has been energy and 
though they have expanded their research areas over the years, they faced an 
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identity crisis as the last nuclear reactor was closed in 2000. By then the 
political climate was changing and the university system at large was given 
a new assignment – innovation. In 2000 the only formal Technology 
Transfer Office of Risø employed was a patent jurist and the few efforts to 
improve the relation to industry were handled by the human resources 
department. Risø was then tasked with justifying a new existence in a new 
political climate – a move that would demand increased interactions out of 
the asylum of basic research.  
At the turn of the millennium the political winds shifted towards more 
market accountability and a focus on boosting knowledge creation in 
society.  This post-nuclear laboratory born of Cold War politics and an 
insular mentality faced an ultimatum: innovate, that is, demonstrate a 
greater focus on technology transfer to industry (hence society), or close 
down operations. Part of Risø’s reaction is to invoke innovation as a 
strategic resource, which thus gives answer to both challenges from the 
political milieu- to increase knowledge creation and market relevance.  
Once “innovation” is on the strategic headline, what happens? Can 
innovation be institutionalized? This article reaches into the practices, 
identities and models (re)formed by researchers and administrators at Risø 
to build in innovation. By digging into the different methods and 
conceptualizations of innovation employed, this article provides a detailed 
look into what happens when a historically entrenched institution is faced 
with the choice to innovate or evaporate.  
This article is an investigation into instances in the transformation of 
the Danish innovation system involving how a national laboratory develops 
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new meanings of technology transfer and knowledge brokering. The story 
reveals what Bozeman in his analysis of national laboratories terms a move 
from a “mission” technology policy paradigm to a more “cooperative” one 
(Bozeman, 2000). In this telling, the government goes from dictating areas 
of strategic research to supporting direct cooperation between research and 
industry. 
The transformation of Risø started to take shape in 2002 when a new 
Vice President – Jon Wulf Pedersen – was hired. His expertise hit squarely 
on helping institutions become more innovative. Although Risø has 
demonstrated a good understanding of the importance of industrial relations, 
innovation was still seen in the old Schumpeterian sense with a process 
from discovery to market (Schumpeter, 1975 [1942]; Schumpeter, 2002 
[1934, 1912]). 
However, during Pedersen’s work to set up a more permanent 
innovation task force, the very notion of innovation was transformed 
multiple times. We see a movement at Risø from thinking of innovation in 
terms of industrial relations, to technology transfer, to a need driven 
practice. (Clark, 1985; Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985; von Hippel, 1976; von 
Hippel, 1994; von Hippel & Tyre, 1995) This follows the trend in 
innovation and in technology transfer literature away from the linear 
understating of how technology diffuses in society. Schumpeter’s view that 
an innovation starts out as an invention and then moves towards the market 
has evolved to a more iterative and interactive understanding of innovation 
in general (Rothwell, 1986; Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985; von Hippel, 1986) 
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and technology transfer in particular (Capart & Sandelin, 2007; Williams & 
Gibson, 1990). 
The Risø case is both illustrative for the policy discussion that can be 
seen in theories like mode 2 (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2003) and triple 
helix (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) yet the case also contributes to 
theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989) on the role that technology transfer can 
play in such an environment. In this sense it is an illustration of how a 
national laboratory acts, proactively, in the transformation of the Danish 
innovation system (Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen, & Dalum, 2002; 
Lundvall, 1992). With the help of the notion knowledge brokering 
(Hargadon, 2006; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) we build a theoretical 
vocabulary for how innovation is institutionalized and how the people 
working with these institutions reinterpret “technology transfer”. 
This reinterpretation can be seen both in work practice and in the use 
of the notion innovation. This reinterpretation is both a reaction to an 
external policy change, but also an internal process where the people 
working with innovation learn from experience. Through their experience 
researchers and managers at Risø build up an undogmatic relation to 
innovation that sees technology transfer as working with different 
experiences coming together in dialogue. The researchers that participate in 
this dialogue are not just experienced in the sense that they are well versed 
in their expertise, but also in the sense that they are open to new experience. 
We use Gadamer’s hermeneutics show the importance of this latter kind of 
experience to invoke a dialogue that facilitate the emergence of new 
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constellations between technology and market. (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 
1960]) 
In section 2 we outline the changing political environment that 
induces the focus on innovation at Risø. In section 3 we sketch some of the 
early experiences of working with innovation at Risø and present a case that 
had great influence on the understanding of innovation at Risø. In section 4, 
we describe the institutionalization of innovation at Risø and the concepts 
that constitute the institutionalization. In section 6 we discuss the 
competences that the people working with innovation at Risø have built up. 
And finally in section 6 we draw some conclusions.  
 
2. THE POLITICAL TRENDS: INNOVATE OR EVAPORATE 
The instances of change towards innovation at Risø started with the hiring 
of a new vice president and the eventual formulation of Risø Innovation 
Activities (RIA) – the main character in this drama. But before we discuss 
the development and implementation of the practice of need driven 
innovation4 some contextual background is helpful.  
2000-2006 was a turbulent period in the Danish educational and 
research system as the government was considering fusing universities and 
closing research labs. Many reports and political action plans were 
published, sometimes with different conclusions and emphasis, and there 
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was a lot of momentum and political will to restructure the whole university 
system.  
One report advised that Risø, and other national laboratories, should 
merge with different universities, thus building on the idea that education is 
the best way to diffuse knowledge into the society (Danmarks 
Forskningsråd, 2002). However, only a year later a new report- or in this 
case an ‘action plan’- came recommending a deeper cooperation with 
industry, thus emphasizing the idea of innovation as knowledge diffusion. 
The governmental action plan from 2003 entitled “New ways of interaction 
between research and industry – turning science into business” states: 
The Danish Government intends with this action plan to make it more 
attractive for both knowledge institutions and the business and 
industry sector to meet and collaborate. A higher number of business 
enterprises should be given speedier and easier access to knowledge to 
allow it to blend in with their products, services and production.  
(Danish Government, 2003 p. 7) 
This call to tighten the cooperation between research institutes and industry 
is also reaffirmed the Danish Globalization report from 2006 (Danish 
Government, 2006), the governments strategy to deal with globalization5. 
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The overall political trends in Danish society – an illustration of the 
theoretical discussions on higher integration between research and industry 
(Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen, & Dalum, 2002; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2003) – as the Danish 
innovation system is moving towards a “cooperative” model (Bozeman, 
2000) is an emphasis on commercializing the relation between university 
and industry. This political shift then implies new roles for both Risø and 
other research institutes, including the university.  
There are at least three ways that Risø attempts to position themselves 
as a unique asset in the research and university system in Denmark. The first 
is their ability to handle large project and large facilities, like the nuclear 
power station of yesterday and today’s clean room, cyclotron and biosphere 
house. Secondly, Risø injected a new vigour into all teaching activities in 
direct response to the governmental reports that linked the role of education 
to knowledge diffusion. The last, and the focus on this article, has to do with 
innovation.  
Innovation is not new at Risø, yet the political changes mark new 
understandings of what constitutes innovation. During the 90s there was a 
focus on industrial relations and in 1999 a SPIN (Situation, Problem, 
Implication, and Need-payoff) course was offered to help researchers 
communicate with industry. The philosophy of SPIN is to learn to listen to 
the problems of the customers, which later became one of the basic 
principles of innovation at Risø. 
Further, we can also see that the notion of innovation gets a more 
prominent place in the formal strategies of Risø. In 1996 innovation is 
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mentioned as an activity, in 2000 it has become part of the mission, and in 
2004 it is a strategic area (along side with heath and energy). The strategic 
area of innovation was formulated as: 
We build up competence platforms and ensure knowledge-sharing 
through establishing and managing networks where our know-how 
can come out into a larger sphere. We provide students and the 
business sector with access to frontline research and major research 
facilities. Through special innovation activities we systematize the 
transfer of knowledge to concrete business concepts. We enter into 
cooperation with existing enterprises and initiate start-up companies. 
We are out-reaching and together with business enterprises we solve 
the technical problems that stand in the way of creating new products. 
We undertake customer-driven activities, solving specific 
assignments and problems for e.g. private companies on commercial 
terms. (From web page)  
While the emergence of innovation as a strategic intent took advantage of 
fertile ground laid from past commercial successes and rhetoric at Risø, 
innovation and knowledge creation as voiced in the political milieu had a 
significant impact on the new innovation activities at Risø that led to the 
development of RIA. 
A noteworthy institutional force to bring innovation on the table 
occurred around 2002 with the hiring of Jon Wulff Petersen as Risø’s Vice 
President. The board of directors decided upon Petersen because of his work 
as the head of Micro Electronics Department at the Danish Technological 
 11 
University (DTU) where he had introduced a more interactive relationship 
with industry. Petersen’s opinion on technology transfer was quite strongly 
bent towards a focus on innovation and start-up. For him the justification of 
strategic research was the effect on GDP, that is, innovation, otherwise 
government ought to use the money on education. 
when the social status of these people [the researchers at Risø] start to 
coming down to the point where you can ask questions about what 
they are actually doing for the tax payers money then these guy’s 
won’t have an answer because there is not a business model for the tax 
payer, its just, so I thought why do we not invent a business model for 
a lab like this. DP (Petersen, 2006) 
Petersen saw the laboratory from the point of view of national economy 
rather than strategic research. It has to be profitable and as in venture 
capital, he asked for a return on investment for the citizens (the investors). It 
is these ideas that lay ground fro the 2004 strategy. 
Risø was already a highly productive institute before Petersen was 
hired. The researchers had many external contacts and were good at 
delivering what was asked for. Risø did test and consult assignments, 
participated in alliances and consortia, and had a good track record of 
licensing and start-ups. However, what Petersen saw when he came to Risø 
was an underexploited research facility. Risø was and always has been very 
good at basic and applied research and yet, seen from an innovation 
perspective, Petersen meant that much more could be done. The question is 
what needed to change to turn a strategic research institute into business 
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model of innovation? Shortly after Petersen began at Risø he had a 
discussion with entrepreneur Jeppe Jessen and together they characterized 
Risø as a place that must have a huge number of slumbering ideas and 
unemployed knowledge that can be harvested. 
3. EARLY INNOVAITON ACTIVITIES 
As a start, Petersen and Jessen felt Risø needed to identify and evaluate 
every activity through a model of innovation with the goal of changing the 
nature of the relationships the scientists had with industry. In order for this 
to occur, Risø employees needed to become more aware of their own 
innovative potentials and Risø as an organization needed to be structured so 
that innovative ideas are given primacy. The result was that Jessen was 
hired on consultancy basis to deal with the issue. 
Yeah, I don’t know how systematic it [innovation] actually needs to 
become… The idea was that Jeppe [Jessen] would hunt down these 
ideas specifically, but also on top of that was the idea that by taking 
contact to companies and having a dialogue with them you would also 
open up a lot of the other stuff you could do with them…bringing 
them up to speed on things that Risø knew about, create collaborative 
project of different kinds, so to say it was an acquisition effort [of 
ideas] of a different type. (Petersen, 2006: 50' 00'') 
Jessen was endowed with a team to map out inventive ideas that had an 
innovation potential under the name “Diamond Hunt”. At this early stage of 
innovation at Risø the practice of innovation was highly Schumpeterian; 
they were looking for inventions that required a bit more energy in order to 
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become innovations (Schumpeter, 2002 [1934, 1912]). The Diamond Hunt 
tried to identify and/or construct new combinations that could start-up as 
companies or be bought by established companies.  
The template used to evaluate the slumbering ideas illustrates the 
understanding of innovation at that time. It has four dimensions and follows 
a very classic understanding of innovation: market, competition, capital and 
team (Ryde, 2003). The model was initially discussed very closely with the 
scientists and in this way the model both worked as an evaluation of idea 
potential, but also served as a means for the researchers to assess the 
strength and weakness of their research from a commercial point of view. In 
this sense the new focus on innovation was not only to see what potential 
inventions that where lying around in the drawers of the researcher, but also 
to acclimate the researcher at Risø to think more in terms of innovation. 
Also at this early stage of innovation, a Business Executive Network 
(BEN) was created to get experienced businessmen to look at the potential 
inventions found at Risø. “The BEN’s” are presented with ideas and 
concepts that have the most market potential and then expected to assess 
and critically examine the analysis done by the interns of the Diamond 
Hunt. Thus the market opportunity analysis further structures the conception 
of an innovation. Jessen, having an entrepreneurial sense, knew the 
importance of taking in market knowledge at an early stage to make the 
innovation process faster and more focused. With this entrepreneurial 
insight we can see a market pull logic becoming integrated in 
Schumpeterian technology push strategy, creating more of a structural view 
of innovation (Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985). 
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Usually people from a science and technology field tend to 
underestimate the knowledge of business people. However, BEN is the first 
indication that business and market knowledge play a more prominent role 
in Risø’s understanding of innovation. Instead of making an entrepreneur of 
the inventor, they brought experienced businessmen in as entrepreneurs. In 
effect, this strategy employed the market as a source of experience and 
knowledge. 
The experience of the Diamond Hunt also had implications for the 
philosophy of innovation at Risø. Most of the prosperous ideas that came 
out of the Diamond Hunt where induced by outside actors – that is they 
were need driven rather than technology push. From three hundred ideas 
that where found in the Hunt only between ten and twenty were innovation 
ripe. From those few ideas with innovation potential, most were induced 
from outside actors.  
3.1. DENTOFIT A CASE OF NEED DRIVEN INNOVATION  
A further incident that coloured the practice of innovation at Risø took place 
simultaneously with the Diamond Hunt. A stated need within dental 
technology shows the complexity of invention – the importance of 
understanding the interrelation between learning and cooperation – and how 
institutionalised roles and networks can help to support innovation. This 
case has been used by the practitioners of innovation in the formation of a 
more co-operative understanding of innovation at Risø and it is easy to see 
many of the influences in the case. In this case the hermeneutics of Gadamer 
helps us to illustrate both the historicity of the change process, but most of 
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all the intricate relation between personal experience and the social 
formation of an innovation. 
Late summer of 2003 the head of the polymer department, Kristoffer 
Almdal received a call from the Dental Materials Department at 
Copenhagen University. They hoped that Almdal could solve the major 
problem of using plastic as a dental filling material. Shrinking is a general 
characteristic of polymers and has been a persistent problem in dental 
filings. Even though that the problem of shrinkage is less today, it still 
creates small cracks between the filling and the tooth which makes it easy 
for bacteria to gather and create cavities.  
Almdal, who had done research in this area before, knew that there 
was no point in following the existing technological trajectory. Major 
companies like 3M had put vast amounts of money in that kind of research 
the last 20 years. So he though they should think of it as a mechanical 
problem and sent the problem with a Project Pilot to the materials 
department. Project pilot is an institutionalized “gatekeeper” (Tushman & 
Katz, 1980) that was introduced at the polymer department at the end of the 
last millennium to handle requests like this. Instead of giving extra 
workload to senior researchers at the department that may get lost amongst 
other responsibilities, the project pilots were specifically tasked to identify 
the right collaborators and drive the project.  
So Alexander van Lelieveld, the project pilot of the polymer 
department, went down to Bent Sørensen at the Materials Department to see 
what he had to say about the problem. After some discussion on putting 
fibres in the polymer, Sørensen came to the idea of using Zirconia. The idea 
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is based on the thought that Zirconia is expanding in some phase 
transformations, which then could be utilized to counter the shrinkage of the 
polymer. Out of five basic ideas brainstormed, this became their main focus. 
However, Sørensen’s knowledge of Zirconia is limited so they wandered 
over to the Fuel Cell Department where Søren Linderoth had more 
experience of working with Zirconia. The basic problem, which became the 
work for van Lelieveld in the coming years, is that Zirconia normally only 
phase transforms at very high temperature and pressure. He had to make the 
Zirconia phase transform at room temperature so that it can be used for 
dental fillings. This is an emblematic story of the research ‘park’ where one 
can wander around and harvest the toil of others.  
As they came to the point of filing a patent for the phase 
transformation of the mix of Zirconia and polymer they learned about the 
Diamond Hunt and Jessen’s work to identify potential innovations at Risø. 
In this way the invention of van Lelieveld, Almdal, Sørensen and Linderoth 
was integrated into the newly developed innovation activities at Risø. One 
of the BEN’s, Per Bækgård, responded to the dental filings case in the way 
that Jessen has hoped: he took on the project of making the invention into an 
innovation. Half a year after the problem was stated, a patent was filed, 
Bækgård was working on a business plan, and contact to venture capital was 
established. During the spring of 2004 DentoFit A/S was founded and the 
start-up was a reality. 
Though the success of DentoFit had to do with timely circumstances 
and other factors, it was clearly picked up as a success story for innovation 
at Risø. The DentoFit case is a good illustration of and came to be a prime 
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example for need driven innovation at Risø. It had several components that 
served to shape future conceptions of innovation at Risø. First, the problem 
came from the outside, thus supporting need driven innovation. Second, the 
project pilot function worked beautifully to drive the problem through 
different experts ending up with set of potential solutions. Lastly, the 
presentation of the invention to the BEN’s enabled the formulation of a start 
up.  Much of the institutionalization of innovation at Risø would come to be 
coloured by DentoFit.  
What we also can see in this case is how invention often needs more 
than long experience and well founded knowledge. Louis Pasteur should 
have said: “In the field of observation, chance favours the prepared mind.” 
However, to be prepared is not enough. Chance in the invention of the 
DentoFit case is reduced by two important dimensions of knowledge that 
can be seen in the hermeneutics of Gadamer (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960]). 
The experience of finitude and the ability to place the problem in a new 
question (re-contextualization) are two dimensions of knowledge that help 
to shed light on the constitution of innovation in the case. To understand the 
implications of these two dimensions of knowledge, we have to understand 
experience as negative and disruptive, rather than cumulative and 
conforming. With this understanding of experience the ontology of the 
situation shifts from facts to interpretations suggesting that perception 
matters when encountering a new situation.   
If we thus regard experience in terms of its result, we have ignored the 
fact that experience is a process. In fact, this process is essentially 
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negative. /…/ The truth of experience always implies an orientation 
toward new experience. That is why a person who is called 
experienced has becomes so not only through experiences but also is 
open to new experience. /…/ Thus experience is experience of human 
finitude. (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960]) 
To realize the limitation of ones own knowledge and the technological 
trajectory that one has been working with is of great importance to 
innovation.  In the Dentofit case, the researchers needed to approach their 
problems with fresh minds; they needed to ask new questions. This is what 
Almdal did when he saw the limitations of his technical experience. 
However, that does not mean that he believes that there are no answers to 
the problem but rather that they would require a fresh approach and new 
questions.  
What Almdal had to face was that the way the problem was framed 
and the consequential questions asked carried a particular historical context. 
The questions restated (re-enacted) a technological trajectory with little 
prosperity of solving the problem. What was required was to move out of 
the framing context in order to ask different sorts of questions, thus 
transforming the problem. To get new answers, to see the problem anew, he 
needed new questions; questions that required reaching into a broader 
problematic. Gadamer explains: 
Thus the relation of question and answer is, in fact, reversed. The 
voice that speaks to us from the past – whether text, work, trace – 
itself poses a question and places our meaning in openness. In order to 
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answer the question put to us, we the interrogated must ourselves 
begin to ask. We must attempt to reconstruct the question to which the 
traditionary text is the answer. (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960] p. 374) 
In the DentoFit case what happened when the problem was handed over to 
Sørensen is that new questions can be asked within a broader problematics. 
Sørensen is not stuck in a “world of plastics.” He sees the tooth and how to 
fix it from a mechanical perspective, exactly what Almdal wanted. It is 
interesting how the shrinkage of the plastic has in this new context turned 
into an advantage, thus the new answer to the new question is a whole new 
problem. 
In this sense we can minimize the amount of explanatory power that 
we give to “chance” in the DentoFit case. We can see both the insight of 
finitude and the reconstruction of questions in the greater problematics play 
an important role in the invention of the DentoFit case. The modest 
experience of zirconia that Sørensen had must be attributed to Pasteur’s 
dictum. The more and broader experience that you have, the greater is the 
chance of finding a solution in a given situation. However, we are not to 
stand on the shoulders of giants; we are to accumulate their headaches, to 
understand their and our finitude which forces us to ask new questions.6 The 
                                                 
6  Others have also given a more ambiguous and dynamic view of how we break with 
history. Thomas Kuhn when he speaks on the relation between history and the formation of 
new paradigms calls it “the essential tension” (Kuhn, 1977) and Spinosa, Flores and 
Dreyfus emaphazise the importance of holding on to an anomaly when they define 
entrepreneurship (Spinosa et al., 1997). Breakthrough in science and technology is neither 
simplistic nor brilliant, most of all it is ambiguous and for the people working with 
innovation it is important to bring out the ambiguity of the situations and problems that 
they are working with. 
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import of preparation and openness cannot be undervalued as a central 
competence for innovation.  
3.2. LEARNING ABOUT INNOVATION 
This is a learning period for those working with innovation at Risø. The 
strategic initiative to encourage and locate innovation at Risø was formed 
into a quasi organization, a sort of boundary spanning activity (Chesbrough, 
2006; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tushman, 1977; Tushman & Katz, 1980; 
Utterback, 1971) to enact an external organization (Marshall, 1997). That is, 
the activities crossed departmental boundaries (Dougherty, 2001; Lindkvist, 
2005) as well as the bounds of the lab itself to reach into industry 
(Bozeman, 2000; Colyvas, Crow, Gelijns, Mazzoleni, Nelson, Rosenberg, & 
Sampat, 2002; Jacob, Lundqvist, & Hellsmark, 2003; Rogers, 2002). 
The Diamond Hunt lessons and the DentoFit case continue to be 
edifying stories retold again and again. These early experiences were as 
much about implementing a new way of thinking as about testing and 
developing tools to deal with need driven innovation at Risø. Helle 
Bunkenborg, who worked with Jessen (and eventually takes over what later 
comes to be Risø Innovation Activities – RIA), speaks of this period as one 
of constant learning, trying to find out which role she is to have and what 
concepts that she is to use: 
[I had to learn] What is it actually that we are trying to do, because 
otherwise I couldn’t tell other people what we where trying to do, and 
that was the sort of, trying to get that more oh, get more understanding 
in the organization of why are we doing this and what are we doing, 
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but also try to sort of get people involved in not only doing it, but also 
understanding what they where doing. (Bunkenborg, 2006 28 min 00 
sec) 
There are three operational dimensions to this learning phase: (1) 
understanding what innovation was about in a national laboratory, (2) 
enacting innovation in the organization, and (3) getting people outside of 
Risø to understand what potentials for innovation exist when cooperating 
with Risø. 
The Diamond Hunt together with the case of DentoFit taught the 
people working with innovation at Risø that they needed to place Risø in a 
larger context and that this demanded rethinking innovation. Hence in the 
same sense as Almdal needed to re-contextualize dental fillings, the people 
working with innovation at Risø needed work with both the context and the 
content of their ideas of innovation. (Later Bunkenborg has stated that also 
RIA became “need driven” in the development of their tools and how they 
worked interactively in the development of their concepts.) By placing Risø 
in an interactive context where industry played the role of inducing ideas 
they saw that they needed to take on the role of knowledge brokers 
(Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) to emphasize interactive learning between 
research and industry. The new structure of the innovation philosophy at 
Risø revolved around a need driven practice with centralized and 
decentralised gatekeepers. The Project Pilot of the DentoFit case also 
became a model not only for the innovation activities at Risø but also 
initiated a new role at Risø called Innovation Pilots. 
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Learning about innovation at Risø came with some surprises. The 
Diamond Hunt was supposed to unearth rough ideas that could be polished 
to commercial successes. However, most of the ideas generated in the 
Diamond Hunt weren’t that useful. Instead, the best ideas were those that 
emerged from outside the laboratory as a specific and local problem for 
some group. The need for fillings came from the dental community, vis-a-vi 
the dental school and was indeed a problem for a larger industry. It was 
drawn through existing contacts of a senior researcher and championed by a 
Project Pilot who spanned multiple departments in his pursuit of a solution. 
In this way, the DentoFit case worked as the paradigm for the practices and 
concepts that grew to have currency within the organization by supporting 
shifting the hunt from inside to outside the lab.  
RIA’s work promoting Risø as full of innovative potential draws 
attention to the cultural dimensions that function in concert with the 
operational dimensions.  It is easy to find people at Risø who were open to 
work with industry, however most people were stuck in collective 
introversion. The notion “outside the fence” is regularly used to express an 
uninterested mass outside the lab that does not recognize the brilliance that 
lay within Risø. Such a perspective is illustrated in a parallel story from the 
head of Optics Department Jens Peter Lynov.  
Lynow overcame his ivory tower and participated in a regional 
development initiative called Musicon Valley. Here he met a local business 
man who was exploring the possibilities of replacing incandescent bulbs 
with a bulb based on LED (Light Emitting Diodes). This business man 
passed the “fences” of Risø everyday on his way to work, but saw it as far 
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too advance a research center to visit. Lynov and the businessman 
reconciled their interests and today Risø has a LED group that continues to 
cooperate with the men who broke the cultural barrier. Also here we have 
people who are open for new experience and break with their ordinary 
context as they explore new cultural environments to get a new perspective 
on what they are doing.  
Musicon Valley also led to some other minor project but most relevant 
to innovation was when Risø arranged a popular “Materials Day” where 
researchers presented new materials to the design community. This 
culminated in a “12+12” meetings where twelve designers met with twelve 
scientists at four successive meetings. The most prosperous result of this 
meeting was a designer chair made of 100% decomposable material. The 
idea to work with designers has also been pursued by the LED group to 
create lamps especially designed for LED technology. The effects of the co-
operation with the design community are today present in the practices and 
identities of both at the materials and optics department. The trend that 
Lynov started helped to tear down the “fences”; and showed the importance 
gatekeepers in enacting the external organization and planted the seeds for 
RIA becoming a boundary spanning organization (Guston, 2000).   
These early innovation and networking activities enacted the idea of 
need driven innovation. Whether it was the needs of the design community, 
a company or an industry, a new paradigm at Risø was instituted and new 
ways of engaging industry were initiated. The open and interactive 
relationships individuals had to the market yielded results. Further, 
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matching up people possessing different areas of expertise gave Risø real 
problems to solve that automatically found a place in the market.  
Von Hippel’s notion of “sticky information” (von Hippel, 1994) is a 
good illustration of the logics that Risø began to practice. The problems that 
different industries encountered in their everyday practice where “sticky” 
from the perspective of Risø, so they needed to develop a practice that gave 
them access to the problems that industry had. Risø had scant expertise in 
what the market needed, but when someone stated a problem, Risø could 
find a process to identify or develop technological solutions. The aim was to 
institutionalize forums and activities where market and technology could 
merge to generate innovation (Clark, 1985; Rothwell, 1986). 
The practice that starts to evolve here is not to diffuse and transfer 
knowledge, but to share experience and to integrate knowledge. Although 
we can see a theoretical literature in technology transfer that focuses on both 
push and pull, the early innovation activities at Risoe illustrates a focus on 
the dynamics of knowledge and learning that takes place both on the pull 
and the push side. To generate high quality technology transfer, interactive 
learning has to emerge where market/business knowledge and technology is 
considered equally important.  
 Market knowledge is upgraded as Risø realizes its core competencies 
in relation to industry. The emerging notions of innovation help to clarify 
what Risø is good at and what it lacks. A relational/interactive 
understanding of innovation develops where science and market are seen as 
equally important. Good science/technology does not sell it self, it needs a 
context and a purpose. In the language of the DentoFit case, Risø has vast 
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experiences, that is, a storage house of answers. However, they need 
questions that have a relevance to the market, so that their answer can get a 
channel to society in general. What was becoming clear was the need to 
systematize these brokering and sharing activities. 
 
4. RIA IN THE MAKING: MOBILIZING INNOVATIONS MOMENTUM  
The experience that Risø accumulated needed to become more structured in 
order to be institutionalized in the organization (Selznick, 1984 [1957]). A 
collection of stories and experiments led to increased enthusiasm and 
awareness for integrating innovation, yet much of the activity was 
spearheaded by the Vice Presidents office, which lacked funds and a 
permanent locale on the organizational chart. What was needed was money 
and durability and dedicated staff. Following the Governments action in 
2003 plan on “New ways of interaction between research and industry – 
turning science into business” the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation (VTU) issued funds in 2005 to come up with “New concepts for 
technology transfer”. This came at perfect moment for the innovation 
activities at Risø and they handed in an application to institutionalize their 
experiences into a more organized structure. 
 This boundary spanning organizational task force – and their 
collected experiments, stories and initiatives – was named Risø Innovation 
Activities (RIA) and had as their major mission to enact a “market driven 
innovation system” for a research institute. Here the vision stated by Jessen, 
the first head of RIA: 
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 The Vision is to create a market driven innovation system, that on the 
background of identified market needs can utilize the latest research 
results to create innovative products, who’s sale will result in 
economic success and more knowledge intensive work places.” 
(Jessen, 2005) 
The idea was simple: since Risø had vast expanses of knowledge within 
many areas, the people working with innovation should find problems that 
the industry had and channel them to the right knowledge. RIA was formed 
to broker such knowledge transfer. 
To create this market driven innovation system Risø wanted to 
intensify the interaction between researchers and industry, change the 
culture of Risø, and expose the researchers to what they called a “problem 
storm”. It was believed that if only industries’ problems could be siphoned 
into Risø, the collective knowledge of Risø’s scientists could prevail over 
solution. Yet while this kind of extroversion was happening in pockets of 
Risø, it was acknowledged that the insular, fenced-in attitudes rampant at 
Risø would need to be overcome for need driven innovation to occur. The 
task of the newly formed RIA was then to work at the cultural 
transformation by serving as a knowledge broker facilitating the relation 
between problems and knowledge (Hargadon, 2006; Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997). 
The idea for RIA was to have a mix of different expertise so that the 
group as a collective could understand the whole range between business 
and technology. The staff at RIA were not to innovate; they where to 
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facilitate the link between business and research to generate innovation. In 
this sense Risø could continue to work with its long term strategic areas 
(develop technology for sustainable energy supply and for the health care 
sector) and on occasion take on short term innovation projects induced by 
industry and mediated by RIA. 
To facilitate this broker activity – to enact an innovation practice that 
would attract industry and to change the culture and attitude of the 
researchers at Risø – RIA harnessed the early innovation activities and 
developed a range of concepts that captured their vision and structured their 
work practice.  
This story of RIA will show how innovation becomes, to some degree, 
institutionalized at a national laboratory. In this it is a story told from the 
within the national laboratory how innovation is perceived and what 
cooperation with industry came to be. This is a story about demystifying 
innovation, where innovation is not just about spontaneous creativity but 
also pragmatic routines, communicative practices, and organizational 
strategy. With the funding the learning enters into a new phase now the 
practice that has evolved in a small community (Brown & Duguid, 1991) 
grows into a distinctive competence of the organization (Selznick, 1984 
[1957]). 
4.1. INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOVATION: CREATING NEW CONCEPTS AND 
NETWORKS 
For RIA, in order to transform Risø from an organization primarily focused 
on long term strategic research to an organization that also engages short 
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term innovation projects, two things had to happen: building up a network 
with industry and preparing the minds of researchers to embrace innovation.  
The work to build up a network with industry has been primarily 
focused on establishing contact and nurturing relationships with Danish 
companies that can help build up a reputation for Risø. This work covers a 
range of activities from participating in local business networks and 
development initiatives to talking with firms that work in the technological 
areas in which Risø has expertise. 
For the internal cultural change, the first step taken was to identify the 
scientists already working with industry and professionalize their 
understandings of innovation. Even though many researchers have an 
applicative understanding of market knowledge, the culture of Risø remains 
detached from short term industrial innovation strategies, and remains 
entrenched in a basic research landscape.  
In order to model innovation for the researchers at Risø, RIA began to 
collect and circulate on a weekly basis positive stories about innovation 
activities in the intranet and the internal magazine.  The gospel of 
innovation is further spread in departmental meetings, conferences, and 
other informal settings. For instance, RIA hosts many outsiders who take an 
interest in new technologies. Following the 12+12 meetings, many designers 
and architects have taken an interest in Risø. For example, as a technology 
watcher from an Architectural firm wants to learn about new materials and 
staff at RIA organizes a tour. RIA scouts out varied meetings around Risø to 
identify possible collaborators. In this sense 12+12 is still very much alive 
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and there is talk of hosting similar events in order to boost external 
relations. 
With regards to preparing the minds of the researchers to embrace 
innovation, the main strategy of the newly minted RIA was conceptual 
development. Bunkenborg aimed to promote newly developed concepts to 
grasp innovation and help the researchers incorporate such a vocabulary in 
order to change the researchers work practices, and shift their identity and 
transform their ways of professing knowledge. To be clear, such conceptual 
development is not absolutely distinct from network development. We can 
see that even the conceptual models have a social function and that the 
networking activities are branded. These activities have both concept-like 
and social diffusion-like dimensions. These concepts thus work as an 
“actants” (Latour, 1987) in that they both manifest and push a social 
development. 
This is to highlight that RIA plays many different roles and many of 
them can be seen as dimensions of an act or a concept. That is, every act of 
RIA seldom fulfils only one function of RIA. For instance, when the people 
of RIA hold a meeting with a head of a department, it is not only to inform 
them about where they can go for funding or to support a promising idea, 
but also to spread a new culture at Risø and to implement some of the 
concepts of innovation that they have created. The work of RIA has to be 
seen as multi dimensional ensemble. As such, the people of RIA have come 
to think in many dimensions about every new activity/project that they 
engage themselves in. 
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This makes RIA’s work highly ambiguous, which may just be an 
illustration of the multiplicity of innovation per se. However, to mitigate this 
multiplicity, RIA has developed and implemented a set of concepts and 
tools to give structure to themselves and to the innovative activities at Risø. 
As all structuring and categorizing of ambiguous social phenomena faces, 
RIA also contends with the problem of interpreting the actual innovation 
activities within their developed concepts. 
This problem presents a deeper major challenge for RIA: not to get 
too content with the concepts and tools that they work with, while at the 
same time, keeping the concept and tools stable enough to give power to the 
organizational change process. This balance between giving power to the 
innovation activities without becoming to harsh and myopic in the 
evaluation of the actual innovation practices demands that RIA stays alert 
and becomes comfortable with some degree of ambiguity. RIA is then 
forced to model a learning culture for the rest of the organization, one open 
to change and revision, yet organized enough to further their operational 
objectives. The concepts that are institutionalized work as a practical 
routine; they come in use as a situation presents an innovation opportunity. 
The following is a tour through some of the activities of RIA, with 
attention to how the concepts and activities became formalized. These 
sections tend to what works and what doesn’t and moves to explicate how 
innovation was (and continues to be) being institutionalized.  
4.2. GAP FUNDING 
One of the instruments that RIA used to encourage innovation was gap 
funding. When the innovation activities started, Risø’s budget was 
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decentralized to the head of departments and earmarked to develop 
technologies that would later be used by industries. In the early innovation 
activities, this frustrated Petersen because it meant that he did not have 
money to incentivize researchers to work differently. It was first with the 
grant from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation that RIA 
was given money to fund internal innovation projects based on the new need 
driven innovation concept. Part of these funds was earmarked for 
‘innovation projects’ which allowed RIA to work with researchers and 
departments to develop promising ideas. These funds allowed a change in 
practice from one where researchers had to “steal” money from other 
projects or use their spare time for ideas that could not be placed in the 
traditional long-term projects. 
Today this kind of funding goes under heading of Gap Funding and 
focuses on the early stages of innovation. The aim is to take an idea to proof 
of concept, so that it will be easier to attract venture capital or firms that are 
interested in a joint venture, alliance or license. This financial organization 
has given Risø a better chance of creating innovation since money is already 
budgeted for innovation activities and therefore a researcher who has a 
potential innovation can apply for Gap Funding. Traditionally many projects 
die in this early stage since researchers, although they might have a passion 
for the idea, they do not see the point in working for free. Usually, a 
researcher would rather pursue well-funded projects that guarantee problem 
solving satisfaction. However, when given the budgetary possibility to 
pursue subsidiary ideas, they regularly did so. The design co-operation that 
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led to a 100% decomposable chair, mentioned above, was funded with the 
help of this Gap Funding. 
Hence, in general the researchers at Risø take an interest in innovation 
projects, but if the hurdle is too high their will is usually not strong enough 
to persist. To state in the strategy that short term innovation is a strategic 
area- without supporting it financially- made it hard for the organization to 
live up to the strategy.  By addressing this budgetary constraint, the GAP 
funding made the strategy of Risø more realistic.  
4.3. THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE 
RIA felt that in order for need driven innovation to be effective, researchers 
needed to be taught to spot innovation potential. The Golden Triangle is a 
mediating device that serves as a means to decide what innovation projects 
Risø is to support.  Based on a critique of an idea’s problem (need 
assessment), financial viability and likelihood of solving the problem, RIA 
is able to make quick, consistent evaluations of potential innovation 
projects. When all three – Problem, Money/Sales, Solution – are in place, 
RIA deems the innovation project worth pursuing and will start to coach the 
project along its innovation process. RIA might also finance the project 
(through gap funding) until the project is ready to seek money from 
customary venture capital channels. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The golden triangle is one of the most prominent examples of the way 
that RIA is thinking about innovation. First, it illustrates that the market is a 
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part of their thinking. Second, it is a very simple sketch of innovation. And 
lastly, it is a tool not only to judge ideas with but also to teach researchers 
about innovation. Hence, the Golden Triangle is as much directed at the 
potential ideas as it is at the user of the concept.  
In addition to an evaluative procedure for new ideas, the Golden 
Triangle has become a way that the people of RIA identify themselves and 
their successes. The icon of the Golden Triangle communicates a very 
simplistic and natural and obvious way to see innovation, the only new thing 
with it was that it has a value of being simple – a researcher is not expected 
to be an expert in innovation, they only needed a tool that indicates 
innovation potential. Being connected to market, commercialization and 
needs in society, the Golden Triangle is highly connected to and relevant for 
the need-driven approach and the new Risø strategy.  
However, RIA also wants this concept to work for itself in the 
organization, so that people working with innovation employ it to make 
initial assessments of a new project. The spread of the concept is also 
important so that a common vocabulary of innovation develops at Risø. In 
this way, the role of RIA in relation to the golden triangle is also to spread 
the gospel of the Golden Triangle and then anchor it in organizational 
practices. When the people of RIA meet others, both formally and 
informally, they promote the Golden Triangle. Bunkenborg here speaks of 
the importance of dialogue to get an understanding of the activities of RIA 
and for its concepts: “but of course it all ends up to talking to people in the 
cantina ‘oh you have a new job Helle [Bunkenborg], what are you doing’ 
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you know it was really dialogue on all levels.” (Bunkenborg, 2006 35 min 
20 sec) 
4.4. RISK REDUCTION AND BUSIENSS DEVELOPMENT 
Once the Golden Triangle is satisfied, thus suggesting that the idea has 
market potential, the next stage is to work with risk reduction and business 
development. The simple Golden Triangle shifts into a diamond where the 
points represent facets of market demand. From Risø’s perspective, 
managing technical risk is standard practice, but managing market risk 
involves skills that the researchers are not accustomed to. The RIA group 
exposes the project to questions of scalability, funding and exit strategies, 
execution and operation, and in doing so facilitates the development of the 
project into an innovation. This is also the stage where relevant cooperation 
partners are contacted and involved. The partnerships are negotiated to find 
the right fit in terms of institutional set-ups, company formation, licensing 
agreements, service contracts, and the like.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Here the design chair previously mentioned is an illustrative example 
of RIA’s business development process. First, need was established through 
RIA’s contact with a designer through the 12 + 12 process; the designer 
wanted a material that was biologically decomposable and had the similar 
functionalities as plywood. Next, researchers at Risø were identified and 
tasked with investigating new materials. The project then received Gap 
Funding from RIA to come up with a proof of concept, which was 
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successful thus leading to a patented process. Strengthened by the success of 
inventing a new functional material and a patent that would enable a start 
up, the designer and researcher set out to form their new company. 
However, the patent was owned by Risø together with the designer which 
meant that the Risø employee had limits on their financial gains, so a 
negotiation started to investigate the innovation potential of the invention, 
given such constraints. 
Here RIA with their analysis step in to assess the market viability of 
the innovation. It was determined that the process patent was too weak to be 
licensed and the prospects to start a furniture company on the patent were 
too risky. If the patent was transferred to an existing furniture company, 
such ownership rights would hinder further development of the process and 
material at Risø. The solution was a start up that sold the material in bulk in 
the form of boards that easily could be transformed into furniture or other 
stuff. RIA also picked a CEO for the start-up that was not part of the 
invention team, mainly because he had more business experience and a 
good network in the Danish furniture and design milieu. 
Here we can see how the RIA group facilitated business development 
(including finding a suitable CEO) to an invention made at Risø. The project 
started as a need from a designer and by integrating market understanding 
into the project early on, RIA managed to come up with a business model 
that was viable for the invention. A further benefit for Risø with this 
business model was that the researcher at Risø was hired on consultancy 
basis both to implement the technology at the production facility as well as 
to further develop the technology for other applications.  
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4.5. THE WORKSHOP 
One day when Jessen was visiting a company, he suggested a new way to 
broker knowledge between them and Risø: a workshop. The workshop 
would be a brainstorming session that focused on some pre-identified 
problems of the company and involved specially selected researchers at 
Risø that may have relevant expertise. Individuals from the company and 
Risø sat down and discussed possible solutions and the event was deemed a 
success. The workshop is an institutionalized meeting forum to bring the 
problems of the industry together with the researchers at Risø. Usually it 
takes place at the company, to make more apparent the organizational 
culture (thereby following the logic of von Hippel’s sticky information) and 
taking into account that problems are highly contextual (Rosenberg, 1982; 
Stankiewicz, 2000; von Hippel, 1994; von Hippel & Tyre, 1995). The idea 
is to get the company to define the problem fairly well so that RIA can hook 
them up with relevant researcher. The people of RIA act as brokers to 
facilitate the process while the researchers provide ideas and possible 
solutions. The workshop is the best illustration for how RIA has 
institutionalized its ideas of need driven innovation. It is a meeting and 
integration of different kinds of knowledge – business and research – where 
new questions are to be asked so that old and new knowledge can come 
alive in contemporary problems. 
One important ground rule of the workshops is that the company 
representatives should be diverse (in terms of research and organizational 
responsibilities). In this way, the spread of different perspectives is believed 
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to allow a multi-voiced, multi-dimensional presentation of the problems 
during the idea generation phase. Yet this diversity is also seen as a way to 
involve those with different decision making powers as a means to up the 
chances for the execution and implementation of solutions. Execution is a 
subject that RIA discusses a great deal in most activities –  there is a focus 
on the actionability of the ideas and RIA has slowly learned that industry 
works with a different mindset and different governance structures that 
impinge upon who has power to put innovation into practice. 
Also here the ideas of the 1999 course in SPIN (Situation, Problem, 
Implication, and Need-payoff) come into play. The philosophy of SPIN is to 
learn to listen to the customers problems in a dialogic way. Hence, rather 
then just tell a story of the brilliance of the research done at Risø, the 
researcher should stand back and listen to want the needs of the industry are. 
In this sense the SPIN course from 1999 has come to live again in the 
practice of the workshop. SPIN together with the experience of the DentoFit 
case has given a structure to the workshop that is dialogic, social and 
focused on learning. Even though there has been a stated demand that the 
company ordering a workshop should have a formulated problem, part of 
the workshop has always been directed at listening to the company’s 
formulation of the problem, and if necessary, open dialogue to reinterpret 
the problem.  
Hence the structure of the workshop follows the same logic of 
experience as we could see in the DentoFit case above. Different 
experiences are important for Pasteur’s dictum, but the differences that meet 
in the workshop (Leonard & Straus, 1997) should come into dialogue, 
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where also the formulation of the problem is ripe for reinterpretation. As we 
saw in the DentoFit case a new technology – the use of zirconia – applied to 
a problem, reinterpreted the entire problem of dental filling. 
This framing and reframing should be understood in relation to a 
tension between openness to the new and familiarity with the old. The 
experience with and knowledge of dental filings allowed a pushing through 
to consider radically different possibilities. The researchers had an 
experience that readied them to be open to new experience. Again we can 
use Gadamer’s hermeneutics to better understand the role of experience in 
knowledge flow- or brokering- of knowledge.  The openness is what 
constitutes Gadamer’s understanding of dialogue and shows the importance 
of prior experience- the SPIN course, dental filings, etc.- to foster such 
experience. Thus in the words of Gadamer “this openness does not exist 
only for the person who speaks; rather, any one who listens is fundamentally 
open” (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960] p. 361) Hence, to be experienced is to 
be open is to be in dialogue is to listen. The workshop in practice constitutes 
an open dialogue between technology and market.  
Gadamer too draws attention to the finiteness of each individual 
experience and the possibility to reformulate the questions (Gadamer, 1989 
[1975, 1960]). Hence, the idea with the workshop is to create a social 
situation where new contacts between questions and answers can solve 
concrete problems. It is not important whether the knowledge is new 
(patentable) or old, but that the questions triggers a new way to apply a 
broad spectrum of experiences. 
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The first workshop was organized highly ad hoc yet laid the 
groundwork and rational for future workshops. In Jessen’s first workshop, 
the company laid out a well defined problem and solutions were found7. The 
interpretation of the first workshop’s success followed an innovation 
perspective: problems lay around outside, ready for technical solutions. 
However, the consequential workshops had different stagings. There 
weren’t always problem easily identified. Sometimes the company was not 
open to brainstorming but wanted specific lab analysis run. However, by 
some measures, the workshops were a success as more requests for 
workshops were coming from industry.  
What RIA was learning however, was that each new encounter with 
industry in a workshop was a new experience. Both RIA and the companies 
had to learn to be open to different expectations, needs and outcomes. These 
surprising encounters led RIA to discuss what the success criteria of a 
workshop should be. Empirically it is far too narrow to define the criteria as 
giving a solution to a well defined problem. However, as long as the 
customers were satisfied and kept coming, RIA decided that strict success 
criteria for the workshops were not necessary. The main purpose was to 
bring the knowledge of Risø into play with industry. 
As the workshop became The Workshop, it became a concept well 
distributed throughout the organization. Several companies were either 
informed by a researcher, or contacted by RIA, and lined up to participate. 
In this way, the initiation of a closer relation between Risø and industry is 
                                                 
7
 However, there was no funding to test the viability of the solution and it took nearly a year 
for the researchers at Risø to return to the company with their final analysis. 
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carried not only by specific RIA activities, but also through the flight of the 
concept Workshop. Hence, as with the case of the Golden Triangle, the 
Workshop has been spread in the organization and is doing its work in the 
way it should as an actant in its own right. 
RIA realized that a set agenda and process management techniques 
were needed to shape the rather open-ended discussions to deal with the 
inexperience of industry in working with outside scientists. Both RIA and 
the industry contacts needed to develop a shared understanding of how 
knowledge sharing for innovation was to be pursued. So while the original 
expectations of the workshop were unfulfilled, new learning and dialogue 
emerged and steps were taken to become acquainted. As Bunkenborg said, 
“even the workshop should be need-driven” and in this way, the workshop 
had success though outside the original conceptualization. Thus the 
managers at RIA showed that their relation to experience where open and 
undogmatic. They walked their talk. As Gadamer notes, “As a rule we 
experience the course of events as something that continually changes our 
plans and expectations. Someone who tries to stick to his plans discovers 
precisely how powerless his reason is.” (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960] p. 
372) Today the workshops are discussed not only in terms of discovering a 
technical need-solution, but also as a network building activity and business 
development8. 
                                                 
8
  Interesting for the general discussion on licensing and patents in the technology transfer 
literature is that no workshop has involved any patents or licenses. Rather, much of the 
knowledge utilized by the researchers in the workshop is obvious to the researchers. In this 
sense the workshops has revealed that much of the knowledge sharing activities in the 
context of RIA does not show up on usual technology transfer indicators like licenses and 
patents. Hence, many of the workshops have turned out to be consultancy assignments 
where researchers advice companies to do or make things a certain way. Risø is selling its 
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4.6. SUPPLEMENTARY TRAINING 
RIA also designs and co-ordinates courses for industry to teach them the 
latest in their field of technology. This is an initiative that has grown 
stronger in response to requests from small and medium sized companies, a 
significant constituency in Danish society. Also this is a result of the need 
driven thinking of RIA and the realization that the workshop could not 
fulfill the spectrum of needs in industry. Supplementary training aligns very 
well with the need driven innovation initiative in that it explicitly increases 
the interaction with industry and helps to diffuse the knowledge of the 
technologies that are being developed at Risø. Such outreach activities are a 
means to generate new projects and to continue the identity shift (both 
internal and external) toward a more innovation friendly atmosphere. 
4.7. INNOVATION PILOT TRAINING AND CO-ORDINATION 
The success of project pilots at the polymer department (also of DentoFit 
fame), triggered Risø to introduce this role also for other departments as 
well. However, in line with the newly focus on innovation they where called 
Innovation Pilots and had a slightly different role. Rather than only working 
with requests coming into the organization, they where to actively engage 
with industry to identify problems and pushing the technology of the 
department. This has shown to be a very good way of institutionalizing 
gatekeepers, but it has also come to be an illustration for the inertia of 
culture. The innovation pilot at the optics department, where Lynov is head 
of the department – noted above for his early work with Musicon Valley – 
                                                                                                                            
know-how, rather then breaking new grounds of research, and industry are invited to 
explore this know-how for its innovation potential. 
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had a whole portfolio of business ideas. However, at another department the 
innovation pilot was set to do all kinds of unrelated administrative work. 
The innovation pilots were a decentralized role answering to their 
respective head of department. RIA organized a network for the innovation 
pilots so they could exchange experience with each other and with RIA and 
so that RIA could inform them about courses on business plans, various 
technology transfer issues, and the like. In this sense, RIA could advise, 
train and network with the innovation pilots, but had no authority over them. 
In practice this meant that the pilots housed in departments that did not yet 
take a great interest in innovation were used as a versatile, general resource 
for the department. 
5. DISCUSSION: MAKING SENSE OF RIA 
RIA is the institutionalization of innovation at Risø, it harbors the 
experience, the network and the concepts that Risø has under the heading of 
innovation (Selznick, 1984 [1957]). Thus we can not speak of a massive 
cultural change of Risø that has fashioned the laboratory into an innovation 
machine. The initial vision of Petersen has not been realized. Nevertheless, 
RIA routinely prepares Risø for innovation by enacting concepts and 
networks within and outside of Risø that makes it possible to channel 
innovation when possibilities arise. 
And I think RIA was a change agent a big part of what RIA was about 
was actually to change the way people looked and developed ways of 
working. There was both a development project, there was the of how 
we do things, there was a change project of how people look at things 
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and there was the actual pipe of projects that where funded through 
the budget of RIA and all three had equal like merit you couldn’t do 
one without the others, so to speak. (Jessen, 2006 17 min 30 sec) 
The experience and learning about innovation encapsulated in the practices 
of RIA has evolved to become a distinctive competence for the laboratory. 
There is no need to eradicate the “old” insular culture of Risoe. Instead there 
are a cadre of experienced and open innovation agents lit up through the 
laboratory. These agents- RIA managers, innovation savvy researchers, 
scientific entrepreneurs- work as gate keepers internally and externally for 
different innovation activities. RIA managers are there too to source 
knowledge from researchers that are not interested in innovation activities 
and they heighten their knowledge brokering roles.  
 
5.1. KNOWLEDGE BROKERING: EXPEREINCE BASED DIALOGUE 
The overarching thrust of RIA is to broker knowledge, to bring together 
market knowledge with research. By using industry as a problem or idea 
generator Risø pursues its support of Danish society through innovation 
(Rosenberg, 1982; von Hippel, 1986). In this sense the role that RIA came 
to play was to broker problems and knowledge (Hargadon, 2006; Hargadon 
& Sutton, 1997) between scientists that develop technology and industry 
that is in the business of technology. In this way, the story of RIA is a story 
of institutionalizing and developing practices for knowledge brokering 
(Hargadon, 2006) in the context of technology transfer. 
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RIA can be seen as an intermediary. In his article on intermediation, 
Howells identifies four different roles that an intermediary agent plays: 
diffusion and technology transfer, innovation management, systems and 
network management, and service organization (Howells, 2006). With their 
focus on need driven innovation RIA adds to this categorization a fifth role-
- that of pooling industrial problems to the laboratory. Thus, they play the 
opposite role of how the “middle men” are traditionally described in 
business (Utterback, 1971). Instead of pooling new technologies to the firm, 
RIA pools business and industrial problems and knowledge to a research 
institute. In this sense, RIA’s brokering is an upgrading of market 
knowledge from the point of view of the laboratory. Instead of maintaining 
the corollary to the ivory tower- the lab benches of the asylum of basic 
research- researchers at Risoe learned, through RIA, the importance of 
market knowledge and business acuity.  
This element of exchange is why we use the term “knowledge 
brokering” rather than “technology transfer”. Technology transfer has a feel 
of one way traffic (Williams & Gibson, 1990). Knowledge brokering on the 
other hand gives the impression that all sources of knowledge are important: 
business knowledge, the problematics and experience gathered within 
industry, and scientific research and problem solving. RIA’s place is in the 
middle of these dynamic environments and its main role is to bring them 
together to generate innovation. 
The trials and experiences of the managers at RIA and the laboratory 
researchers points to the import of openness. Though not open to 
everything, but towards the tensions what we have learned and what we 
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might learn. We need to find the cracks in our problems and switch pivotal 
points around which we turn it. According to Gadamer, this is the 
fundamental insight that experience can teach us. 
The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new 
experience. That is why a person who is called experienced has 
become so not only through experience but is also open to new 
experience. (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960] p. 355) 
In this sense the knowledge brokering situation is like a hermeneutical 
situation. 
We always find ourselves within a situation, and throwing light on it 
is a task that is never entirely finished. This is also true of the 
hermeneutic situation – i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves 
with regard to the tradition that we are trying to understand. 
(Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960] p. 302) 
The insight that we are limited makes us open to others and to the boarders 
of our knowledge. We never break free we only reinterpret. This is as much 
a reinterpretation of ourselves as the problem that we are trying to solve we 
need to reinterpret how we got here. And we need to carry with us both the 
ambiguity and the insights that tradition handed down to us.  
Brokering knowledge is then to re-contextualize with the help of 
knowledge. Not to dig deeper in our knowledge, but to open up and let 
others and different knowledge redefine our problem. We need to recognize 
both the finitude and the possibilities of our own experience and how it 
 46 
changes meaning in different contexts. Depending on the questions that we 
ask, the problematics that the knowledge carries with it transforms. When it 
transforms knowledge into something new that fulfils a need we call it 
innovation. How to work with the needs of industry (or society) to re-
contextualize the knowledge of a research lab became the essential question 
of RIA. 
We saw this iteration between experience and openness most clearly 
in the DentoFit case which then influenced the way RIA began to 
understand the workshop. The experience of dental filing was needed to 
understand the problem, but it was also required in order to see the 
traditional way of interpreting the problem as finite. Only the experienced 
could see that the experience about the problem was not enough. The re-
questioning opened up for re-interpreting the problem. To invoke and guide 
this re-questioning into an open dialogue is the practice of knowledge 
brokering that became formalized through RIA. 
In a brokering situation there is however no need to create ambiguity. 
The multitude of experiences that arise around a problem are vast enough to 
invoke questions that reinterpret and transform the situation. The major 
tasks are rather to tame, harness and make productive the ambiguities that 
are already present. Hence in a brokering situation you are working with a 
tension between ambiguity and focus that evolves dynamically in a 
converging and diverging way (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). 
 Others have also given a more ambiguous, dynamic and focusing 
view of how we transform history to enact the future. Thomas Kuhn 
addresses  the relation between history and the formation of new paradigms 
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and calls it “the essential tension” (Kuhn, 1977). Spinoza, Flores and 
Dreyfus emphasize the importance of holding onto an anomaly when they 
define entrepreneurship thus raising the spectre of novelty and difference 
(Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997 p. 50). Both emphasise the structuring as 
well as the ambiguity of a innovative situation; two features which come 
clearest in an understanding of finitude (Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960]) A 
brokering situation should not just aim to bring knowledge to the table, but 
to see the finitude of the different knowledges and what structuring can 
bring them together. This helps the players to ask new questions, questions 
that will transform history into a prosperous future. 
 
5.2. READINESS: THE CORE COMPETENCE OF KNOWELDGE BROKERING 
Each dimension of RIA’s operation – concept formulation, networking, 
training, spreading stories of innovation and evaluation – contributed to the 
institutionalization of readiness. To be ready for innovation, means 
understanding an innovative situation when you are in it. The concept 
Golden Triangle is a good illustration of this principle. From an identity 
perspective it is a palatable way of introducing a complex phenomena to an 
organization that also has a more consolidated identity that it needs to keep.  
At Risø, the main working task is to apply and develop technologies 
within long term projects. The Golden Triangle concept allows researchers 
to adhere to that mission as it does not demand that everybody should go 
around and think innovation all the time. It only asks for readiness in 
specific situations and to apply individual knowledge to some other 
problems at some occasions.  
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The most important feature of the work of RIA is to get market and 
technology to meet in a very concrete manner and with high degrees of 
openness and vibrancy. As the experiences with the Workshops illustrate, 
this cannot be done with well defined structure and rigidity. Here also we 
can see how readiness is an important feature of the competence that RIA 
has institutionalized which also points to a broader hermeneutical insight. 
“The hermeneutical consciousness culminates not in methodological 
certainty, but in the same readiness of experience that distinguishes the 
experienced man from the man captivated by dogma” (Gadamer, 1989 
[1975, 1960] p. 362). There is no general method for bringing technology 
and market together, but RIA can helpfully develop a vocabulary – a set of 
concepts – that guides innovation activities. 
These concepts are evident when applied in the practice of bringing 
market and technology together. That is, the practice of a workshop takes 
definition as the different experiences come into dialogue. Following 
Gadamer, a true dialogue should not have a predefined end. Rather it 
unfolds itself as the interlocutors start their conversation: 
No one knows in advance what will “come out” of a conversation. 
Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus 
we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill 
fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its won, and 
that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it 
– i.e. that allows something to “emerge” which henceforth exists. 
(Gadamer, 1989 [1975, 1960] p. 383) 
 49 
As we gleaned from RIA’s experience with trying to develop success 
criteria for The Workshop, the ultimate outcomes were emergent. The 
Workshop was a success when something emerged from it. From an 
innovation perspective – and from RIA’s perspective – this something 
should have a value on the market.  
The other crucial element to these emergent practices – in addition to 
the qualities of openness and readiness – is the dialogic character. RIA 
advocated for the researchers (in a Workshop, in working with the Diamond 
Hunt, in constructing a start-up) to be open for re-framing and re-
interpreting. Likewise, in a reflexive move, the managers at RIA were 
themselves open to learn anew. Their methods for governing the workshop 
shifted with each new experience instead of following a dogmatic cycle. In 
this way, both the managers of the innovation processes at RIA as well as 
the scientists in the laboratory are called upon to work beyond their own 
experience and develop concepts that are open enough to harbour their 
readiness. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Fresh encounters with problems, policy statements, tools, strategic concepts, 
inventions, industrial needs and market dynamics are all implicated in a 
learning process that both illustrates an innovation system, but also changes 
the innovation system. RIA is the centre of this swirling learning process yet 
without victimology. Rather we can see a proactive, productive stance to the 
types of tools and concepts spurred to action by those at RIA. To be sure, 
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RIA enacts the policy recommendations, yet in doing so they develop tools 
that extend policy and industries’ expectations of a research lab. 
The internal learning process of RIA is an illustration of local 
innovation philosophy. They learned from the problems that they 
encountered and while institutionalizing some dimensions they also held 
open some institutionalizations. Instead of setting up rigorous structures that 
might indeed defy habitability, RIA came to understand their role as one 
characterizing openness and readiness for change. For RIA, it is impossible 
to facilitate within predefined structures and processes. Yet, to be sure, 
some degree of institutionalization is necessary for sustainability.  
Cultural change alone cannot be expected to reinvigorate a research 
organization like a national laboratory into an extroverted benefit to society. 
Quite simply, most people working in such an organization have personal 
agendas that are not easy to change. However, what can be done is a more 
structured internal network that promotes and handles innovation activities 
and provides a language and lens from which to identify innovation. The 
sub-central actors then work to siphon innovation initiatives coming from 
industry to the central innovation agency (RIA) for handling. 
Funding is an essential sort of formalization. Without internal and 
external funding, RIA would not have developed. Many of the projects that 
received Gap Funding from RIA would have withered without it. To have a 
money bag ready at hand for innovation projects – organizational as well as 
technological – is essential for successfully institutionalizing innovation. 
There was a small task force for innovation before RIA, but not with the 
same intensity and vigour as the group formed on the basis of real funding. 
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Additionally before the formation of RIA many of the innovation projects 
were financed with spare time and through “stealing” time from other 
projects. Serious funding gave spine to the initiatives induced by the 
different actors. 
Last, innovation within technology transfer is dialogical and has to be 
that way. Most innovations require a kind of interdisciplinary which 
mandates a meeting and brokering of different experiences. An 
institionalized innovation process succeeds in so far as such different 
experiences are mediated with openness and readiness. Otherwise, 
knowledge is the trap and unfocused monologues reign with little meeting 
of the minds. RIA has been able to develop a framework that structures the 
multitude of experiences that meet in the no-man’s-land between research 
and market into a constructive dialogue. However, since both research and 
market are dynamic and ambiguous entities, the dialogue is wise to shy from 
a predefined goal, rather it should be judged based on what has emerged in 
the dialogue. 
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WEB: 
Risø Strategy 
http://www.risoe.dk/Risoe_dk/Home/About_risoe/fakta_risoe/Strategien/tek
nologi_konkurrence.aspx 
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